Why do I Love Indoctrination

There is perhaps no argument as interesting as the “indoctrination argument.” When either proponent of a political party throws out the classic “you are indoctrinating kids” at the other side.

“Oh! The schools now are just indoctrinating LGBTQ kids into ‘cults’ and training them to become future sex slaves or whatnot,” is one classic argument from the right.

Meanwhile, those on the other side are always quick to point out the contradiction: the right, as they say, are the “real” indoctrinators—indoctrinating kids into proto-fascist ideologies, Christianity, conservatism, and blah blah blah.

To the so-called “smart people,” those who hold a “neutral opinion” on things, this may seem like a political farce: two evil indoctrinators, or innocent non-indoctrinators, yelling at each other about whether both sides did or did not do it—it seems like the classical political farce.

Though I hold no such position, I do find this situation a bit farcical: both sides are not evil indoctrinators nor innocent non-indoctrinators but are instead indoctrinated by a “system” of language, culture, religion, institutions—indoctrinated by what philosophers refer to as the structure.

The structure is the form of relationships between objects that constitute a set meaning—be it practices, language itself, culture, or even institutions. For example, the meaning behind the symbol of the communist flag is constituted through its relation with other symbols: it is not just the reference-referent system (which in structuralist terminology is signifier-signified). When we see the communist flag, we are not only seeing what its reference is (the communist flag or the communist flag of the party that holds it), but we are also seeing a series of other meanings behind it. For some, it might be oppression (which in itself is another symbol up for the constitution of other elements), and for some, it might be salvation (same as oppression; i.e., it could be salvation in a Christian sense and a normative sense). Yet, it is much more than that: for some, it will be connected to the current liberal agendas in the US. Often, though, the meaning might be compounded on each other—the communist flag might represent all simultaneously.

This seemingly basic proposition has serious ramifications: the fact that there lies a multitude of meanings generated by the relations of symbols between symbols implies a set relation that influences our thoughts since, after all, our thoughts—from their generation to formulation and transmission—are dependent on language. Then, the terrible conclusion must be made true: our thoughts are not entirely our own, or maybe not at all—all of them are designated by some background structure.

Then the dispute between liberals and conservatives on indoctrination becomes clear: indoctrination itself is, as with all symbols, a symbol constituted by relations with others. The liberal sees the relation between Christianity (something conservative and oppressive in their mind) and fascism constituting indoctrination, so it is perfectly reasonable that the conservative, a group that fits, though not perfectly, with the descriptions but definitely checks the boxes. While the conservative sees a demand for absolute positivity, an assault on their children’s perception of the sexes, which is something evil in their minds, aligning perfectly with the liberals. Neither conception was due to a personal thought, but the relation with other symbols, which is constituted by other symbols. Therefore, in this case, both are indoctrinated by the underlying structure of language—the backdrop behind thinking.

Yet, I think this is an inadequate conclusion to our brief writing here, as the real question has not been addressed: what made the symbols relate as such, and why are the symbols related differently for different people? When we chase down this question, the simple operation of structuralism here seems to break down. Perhaps it is time for us to turn to another eye: Lacan and Derrida.