Of Free Will: part 1

If anyone asks why the possession of free will is important, the answer is usually, “Its existence enables moral responsibility.” It is also for this reason that many center their arguments around whether one’s position on free will— or the opposing position— entails moral responsibility or not. Throughout the centuries-long journey of attempting to settle the matter of free will, there has, as expected, been a plethora of takes on this issue. Yet, what strikes me as most interesting is the common agreement that, regardless of one’s stance on free will— be it determinism, compatibilism, libertarianism, agent-causal theory, or, perhaps most evidently, free will skepticism— there must be moral responsibility in some form. Compatibilism attempts to redefine free will, determinism provides multiple explanations (one of which argues that consequences are determined along with the criminal act), libertarianism prides itself on its emphasis on moral responsibility…

For any diligent reader of Derrida and Husserl, this persistent emphasis on moral responsibility is bound to pique interest. Why this obsession with moral responsibility? But perhaps, to ask the Derridean question: why this emphasis on morality without a discussion of what moral responsibility actually is?