How Does the Concept Become the Material

(A Development from “What of Light and Dark: A Quick Trip into the Dialectic”)

One question I have always pondered about Hegel is his claim regarding the necessity of the antithesis, or more precisely, the inherent contradiction and the necessity of resolving it. According to my cursory understanding of the dialectic, the necessity of the "absence," or the "not-A," arises on a conceptual level: the need for "not-A" stems from our need to cognize it. It appears to be an epistemological necessity, not something that necessarily exists in itself. What, then, is the problem with this interpretation? The problem is that it is applied in history, where the necessity must be factual. The progress of history, driven by the dialectic, involves the subject’s sublation into the Idea, ultimately reaching the Absolute Spirit—this is a factual necessity. It has to happen. The rise of Hitler, for instance, was historically necessary to push the development of liberalism: we can observe the rise of benign capitalism (liberalism) and see a surge of deconstructionist, anti-authoritarian, and anti-fascist philosophies after the Nazis. This suggests that the positing of A (fascist authoritarianism) gives rise to the necessity of not-A (freedom, liberalism, and anti-authoritarianism).

The question now is: is this necessity merely in our heads, something we cognize just like we cognize causality—a concept without objective existence? (As Hume suggests, causality doesn’t actually exist; it’s impossible to establish it factually.)

Does this doubt cast a shadow on the Hegelian sublation, the reconciliation of contradictions? If this limitation of necessity remains purely on the conceptual level, then the sublation is not moving toward its totality, its end. We are not advancing toward an objective, historical end but are merely shifting perspectives—essentially, creating a new “salad” of old ideas.

Thus, the account of the materiality of the dialectic in “What of Mistakes: A Quick Trip into the Dialectic” seems faulty: the necessity of its existence does not rule out the possibility that the dialectic remains a conceptualization. Both proposition (A) and its absence (not-A) could exist, while the connection of “necessity” remains merely a concept in our minds.

Should we reject Hegel based on this?

Perhaps not. A question still begs to be asked: is this conceptualization, this shift in perspective, truly “effectless”? Let’s step outside the dialectic and examine the role of the subject in the world. The subject has the ability to change society (as evidenced by Marx and Keynes in the social sciences) and nature (as seen in ecology and the industrial revolution). Is it not what the subject thinks and does precisely through conceptualization—through shifting perspectives? We can see how the shift in perspective within Marxism created one of the most radical alterations in society. We can also see how the conceptualization of industrialism has led us down a path of environmental destruction.

It could be argued that it is precisely through the shift in perspective that we produce action. Therefore, regardless of whether the dialectic is a shift in perspective or not, we nonetheless produce the relation it describes. By conceptualizing, we shift the perspective of the dialectic and, in doing so, establish the necessity of the relation.

We now have a new interpretation of Hegel. Perhaps this interpretation is more powerful than any other.