Slavoj Zizek's Paradox of Freedom

Slavoj Zizek is famous for many things, and one of those things is his enumeration of the “paradox of freedom.” To Zizek, freedom is paradoxical by definition: a free worker could freely choose to sell himself into slavery—freedom entails the possibility of its own end. Is this not exactly the case? A worker who is desperately trying to gain financial freedom eventually sells himself into the oppression of capitalism (if we were to be Marxists). Even without the Marxist definition of oppression, this still holds true: in George Orwell’s Animal Farm, the animals, in their pursuit of freedom, eventually sell themselves into the slavery of the pigs. In normal society, we see a plethora of such examples: students freely choosing to “sell” themselves into the “imprisonment of schools,” individuals willingly integrating themselves into society, consumers pulling the classic “I know it is stupid, but I will nonetheless throw my money into that,” and, if we are to take the stupidest example, BDSM enjoyers willingly selling themselves to “masters.”

If we are to look at the reasons behind why various groups give up their freedom, we can identify two key factors: structure and psychology. Is it not society compelling students to schools, individuals to conformity, and workers to their bosses? And is it not desire compelling consumers toward their products and BDSM enjoyers toward their “masters?”

Now, we see a problem: in practicality (with regard to society), structures always exist. Does that mean we have all given up our freedom for something? Is it my agency behind every purchase, or am I already rigged by ads, culture, and conformity—rigged by the backdrop that is late-stage capitalism? Is my career choice really my own to decide, or is the same force that governs what I consume also governing what I choose to do for the rest of my life? It is worth clarifying that I am not denying agency here—to say there exists a causal/influential link between capitalism and how I lift my arm is idiocy—but the discussion is about the social aspects of our freedom (which I will call social freedom for short), that is, the aspect of our freedom that relates to choices within a society (how I choose to have a family, what jobs I would pick, what my ideology is, and so on).

How does structure compel someone to choose? Zizek would answer this by saying that the structures of society—in this case, ideology—create a false perception of freedom, a false choice. Think of the normative discussions of freedom: they center around choice and determination—abstract discussions regarding individuals. When we generally think of the word “freedom,” it is also this normative discussion that we relate to, even if the context is about society. The metric for oppression and the removal of freedom has always been “can an individual do this in X state?” or “does X state allow Y actions?”

There exists a general negligence of the practical ontology of freedom—what form does freedom take in modern society? It is precisely this question that Zizek would ask and, later, answer: ideology—the amalgamated “consciousness” of our desires and societal structures—suppresses “freedom” by packaging unfreedom as freedom. Think of the classic Marxist argument: the capitalist sells freedom as the ability to chase one’s own goals according to one’s own capacity, converting revolutionary sentiment into motivation to “climb higher in the social hierarchy”—turning “injustice from society” into “lack of individual ability.” This is exactly how ideology suppresses freedom: a good Switch-A-Roo of truth and lies.

Therefore, our quest for freedom should begin by interrogating the backdrop and structures that shape freedom—both as a concept and in practice.